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This chapter presents a theoretical argument that looking at how some
grand matters of politics are simpliﬁed for practical use on the street is
necessary to adequately understand how ordinary Serbs and Croats (and
to a limited extent, Muslims) were transformed into enemies of their
neighbors, workmates, and covillagers in the havoc wrought in BosniaHerzegovina between 1992 and 1995. Locals’ shifting attitudes toward
consanguinal identity, expressions of greeting, and dressing patterns are
found to be examples of everyday practices through which perceived
differences in civilization, competitive ideas of statehood, and macroconstructions of group identity produce ethnic conﬂict. A broad
conclusion is that attention to localized manifestations of the macropolitical will yield more comprehensive understanding in analyses of
ethnic conﬂict.
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Explanations of collective violence based solely on the macro concepts of
state, nation, religion, and history tend to remain rigid. They fail to capture
the relatively unimpeded processes and mechanisms in and through which
such macro concepts are appropriated at the local level to justify symbolic
and physical aggression toward one’s kinsmen, next-door neighbor, and
fellow villager. Blaming collective political violence on differences in
civilization, competitive ideas of statehood, and normative constructions
of ethnonational group identity falls short of explaining how these
differences, competitions, and vying constructions manifest themselves in
the everyday practices of victims and perpetrators of destructive political
conduct. What, then, is needed is a binocular look: one that is both aware
of the deﬁning characteristics of macrostructural phenomena1 and that
considers how – through which processes and mechanisms – macrostructural phenomena are embodied, internalized, and instrumentalized for
aggressive purposes by real human beings in real locales. In other words,
one that is both aware of the intrinsic properties of a given macrocosm and
the simpliﬁcation of overarching, conﬂicting political identities deﬁning that
macrocosm to a given microcosm.
In relating, then, a brief account of the havoc wrought in BosniaHerzegovina between 1992 and 1995, I will seek in this paper to
approximate the kind of look described above. To do so, I will heed the
caveat that ‘‘In place of global explanations of [collective violence], a more
particularistic approach, one that adequately deals with multiple levels –
from small scale to large scale – on which collective violence occurs, yields
greater understanding’’ (Rubinstein, 1994, p. 986). To convey a sense of the
battles fought to achieve various objectives (keeping demographics in
balance, controlling access to territory, the governmental apparatus, and
the history of the region – in other words, controlling politics per se), I will
employ an anthropological perspective. This perspective not only looks
at the grand picture painted by various social scientiﬁc accounts of the
1992–1995 Balkan War, but is also ethnographically informed as to how the
macroreligious, macropolitical, and macrohistorical colors of the grand
picture are ﬁne-shaded, or localized, on the street, in the village, at the
workspace, and so on. Unless we look at how grand matters of politics are
or can be simpliﬁed for practical use on the street, we will fall short of
adequately understanding why ordinary Serbs and Croats (and to a limited
extent, Muslims) were transformed into ardent enemies of their long-time
neighbors, workmates, and covillagers. In what follows, I will be relying on
a limited number of ethnographies of the Balkan War as well as on some
key anthropological observations by political anthropologists with view to
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developing a conceptual tool with which macro- and micro-level factors can
be bridged to yield a better understanding of collective violence and its
consequences.
In a recent, insightful article, the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins created
the phrase ‘‘elementary form of structural ampliﬁcation’’ (Sahlins, 2005,
p. 25) with which he intended to capture the process in which a conﬂict
characterized by its local nature is inﬂated to the supralocal level. Charting
the course of Cuban and US governments’ and publics’ heavy involvement
in what was otherwise an oft-repeated and ordinary state of affairs,2 Sahlins
documents how the little Elian Gonzalez became entangled in discussions
of communism, freedom, and the Cold War. The ﬁght over Elian’s custody,
waged initially between Elian’s relatives in Miami and Cuba, engaged the
larger ideological opposition between American and Cuban governments
and publics. Sahlins refers to the process wherein a minor, localized
dispute engages a broader set of opposition as ‘‘structural ampliﬁcation’’
which makes a macrohistory out of a microhistory (Sahlins, 2005). In my
discussion below, I chart the course of a reverse process – one in which an
ethnonationalist and exclusivist discourse gets appropriated in a village
whose inhabitants have otherwise been living in relative peace and harmony.
In other words, I look at how ethnonationalist macropolitics gets deﬂated
only to be reconﬁgured within the power relations in a rural context. I will
thus appropriate Sahlins’ term with a slight modiﬁcation: ‘‘Structural
simpliﬁcation’’ of ethnonationalist exclusivism in a central Bosnian village,
or the reconﬁguration of power relations in a rural context out of
macropolitical discourse.
In the ﬁrst section below, I will provide a brief account of the 1992–1995
war in the Balkans which ended with the peace agreement signed in Dayton,
Ohio in 1995 during the Clinton presidency. The second section discusses
some macrolevel phenomena whose on-the-ground appropriation will be
treated in the third section, where I rely on Bringa’s (1996) ethnographic
analysis of a village in central Bosnia called Dolina (a pseudonym). In the
fourth section, I seek to shed some anthropological light on the subject
matter with reference to the work of such political anthropologists as
Friedman (1998) and Tambiah (1996). I end the paper with some concluding
thoughts, inspired by Lewellen (2003) and Gledhill (2000), on the beneﬁts of
anthropological thinking for a better understanding of the processes in
which grand concepts such as history, ethnicity, and religion get dissolved
and ﬁnd parochial manifestation. As a result, power relations in a given
microcosm may come to be conceptualized rather differently compared to
how they were before, with the end result being ‘‘collective violence.’’
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 1992–1995 WAR
IN BOSNIA3

3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39

After Josip Broz’s (Tito) one-party socialist rule over former Yugoslavia
ended in 1980 with Tito’s death, a struggle ensued over the federal republic’s
economic, political, and military resources among representatives of the six
republics and two autonomous regions that had constituted the federal
Yugoslav Republic. Through his control of the party apparatus which
outlived Tito and with his inﬂuence over national media, Serbian leader
Slobodan Milosevic gained immense political power. He used that power
to amend the Serbian constitution to strip Kosovo4 of its autonomy.
Witnessing Milosevic’s repressive policies against Kosovars (namely the
Albanian Kosovars) and his maneuvers to capture the federal government
apparatus, other entities in former Yugoslavia5 sought to separate
themselves entirely from the federal structure by declaring their independence through their governments, which had been recently elected before the
onset of the war in 1991. By that time Milosevic had acquired the tools that
he thought would help him create the ‘‘Greater Serbia’’: political power and
total control of the military. To Croatia’s vote for secession from the federal
structure, the Milosevic-controlled Yugoslav National Army responded
by seizing one-third of Croatian territory and massacring thousands of
Croatians. The Bosnian declaration of independence was followed with the
siege of Sarajevo – the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early April, 1992.
Commanding the heavy and sophisticated artillery of the army of former
Yugoslavia, Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb compatriot Radovan Karadzic
engaged in systematic ethnic cleansing throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina with
the aid of ﬁerce nationalist propaganda emanating mainly from Serbia. The
end result of 4 years of war was the killing of some 200,000 Bosnians,6
organized use of rape as a military tactic against Muslim and Croatian
women, severe instances of torture, and destruction of infrastructure such as
power systems, schools, hospitals, transportation networks, etc. The war
ofﬁcially ended with the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Accords in Dayton,
Ohio, in December 1995. Serbians were granted 49% of the territory they
occupied in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the remaining 51% is now the
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina composed of Muslim and Croat rotating
leadership, each governing its own territory with a separate government,
police force, and military but being subject to a central government’s rule in
matters of ﬁnance and foreign policy.7
What should the war in former Yugoslavia be blamed on at a
macrophenomenal level? How was the road to genocide paved in Bosnia?
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Relying on Norman Cigar’s (1995) benchmark study Genocide in Bosnia,
I would like to emphasize in concise form some of the important overarching
factors instrumentalized by the Serbian political decision-making mechanism
to induce Serbian public opinion into believing in the legitimacy of Serbian
government’s dream of achieving a pure ‘‘Greater Serbia’’ at the expense of
other ethnic, non-Serb groups populating Bosnia-Herzegovina. These factors
pertain to competitive ideas of statehood in the post-Tito era, normative
constructions of ethnic superiority and vulnerability, and the supposed threat
of escalating radical religious (Islamic) fundamentalism. Two other factors,
voiced by some American writers such as Robert Kaplan and Samuel
Huntington, include the idea of the ever-presence of historically embedded
ethnonational rivalry and hatred, and the notorious ‘‘clash of civilizations’’
thesis as they apply to the region. Whereas Cigar’s account of macrolevel
factors is well documented and evidenced, Kaplan’s journalistic impressions
regarding the causes of violence and Huntington’s remarks, which I brieﬂy
look at below, will exemplify in particular why top–down analyses should be
corrected and complemented by views ‘‘from below.’’
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Cigar (1995) traces the roots of Serbian nationalist expansionism, whose
culmination was the war, to the goals explicitly voiced in a document
produced in 1986 by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Serbian
Memorandum. Drafted in a Westphalian spirit, this document envisaged the
foundation of a pure Serbian state encompassing all Serbs regardless of
which former Yugoslav republic they were living in. In Cigar’s words,
‘‘Coming at a time of impending change and uncertainty, the Memorandum
seemed to answer the need for a national strategy blueprint for Serbia’’
(Cigar, 1995, pp. 23–24). The implementation of the Memorandum could
only come about by uprooting other ethnicities of the former Yugoslav
republic, which is precisely what Serbian nationalism sought to do with the
war, as indicated by the forced displacement of several hundred thousands
of Bosnians now scattered across Europe and the United States. Thus, the
post-Tito Serbian nationalism found its most obvious expression in the
statements of Serbia’s academic elite. This was followed by the stereotypiﬁcation of would-be victims, in particular Bosnian Muslims, in and
through popular culture. An example discussed by Cigar (1995) is the
description of Bosnian Muslims as aliens, inferiors, and cold-blooded
murderers by a best-selling novelist named Vuk Draskovic, whose writings
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inﬂuenced no less a ﬁgure than the commander of the Serbian Guard,who
admitted to having beaten Muslims (and Croatians) because of the fury
ingrained in him through these writings (1995, p. 25).
Next came the work of Serbian scholars specializing in the study of Islam.
This work represented Islam and its adherents as backward, hostile to
European civilization, and fundamentalist masterplanners of Serbian
destruction. This work further disseminated the idea, frightening to the
average Serb, that there were plans to repatriate more than a million Turks
to Bosnia, which clearly would contribute to the Islamization of BosniaHerzegovina in the post-Tito era (and would indicate a reembracing of the
spirit of the Ottoman Empire, which ruled over the Balkans for more than
four centuries). Serbian scholars felt that these developments should be
countered by any means possible. This academic effort was then bolstered
by the efforts of the Serbian Orthodox Church whose representatives
evidenced their claim of Muslim primitiveness by pointing to the fact that
walls were built around (Muslim) Albanian houses, which to them
demonstrated that Muslims (especially Muslim women) were not liberated,
and ‘‘hidden behind walls’’ (Cigar, 1995, pp. 27–32). The Memorandum,
Serbian popular literature, the denigrating work by Serbian scholars of
Islam, and the Serbian Orthodox Church’s efforts were thus factors in
the escalation of Serbian ethnonationalist exclusivism which culminated in a
4-year war between 1992 and1995 against non-Serb ethnicities. Although
the macrophenomenal reality of these factors and their inﬂuence are well
illustrated in Cigar’s work, a more comprehensive understanding requires
ethnographic particularism to visualize the processes and mechanisms in
and through which such macrophenomenal realities are effectively
parochialized – or structurally simpliﬁed. This will help in answering the
question: ‘‘How were people [of the Balkans] who had lived quietly together
as neighbors for forty-ﬁve years [since the end of second World War]
manipulated into killing one another and burning each other’s houses
down?’’ (Besteman & Gusterson, 2005, p. 7)
Whereas accounts of the conﬂict in the Balkans such as that of Cigar
would get enriched and not necessarily refuted or corrected by an
anthropological approach, other works on the Balkans would probably
have to be rewritten in view of the insights provided by an anthropological
perspective. Such two works on the two supposed causes – ancient hatreds
and civilization clash – of the war are Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts (1993)
and Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1993). Following is a
brief overview of the arguments of these two works, and anthropological
critiques of them.
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For Robert Kaplan (1993), the collective violence in the Balkans was a
modern-day reincarnation of ancient ethnonational feelings of hatred that
all sides partaking of the violence had been breeding against one another
since time immemorial. The ‘‘Balkan syndrome,’’ as he termed it, was
something like an evil gene predisposing Balkan people toward erupting in
violence. Hence, there is not much reason to be startled at the atrocities that
the Balkan people meted out against one another.
In a devastating critique of Kaplan’s travelogical assumptions (my term,
by which I intend to convey a sense of the unreliability of such sweeping
generalizations which do call for an attention to detail of the anthropological kind), anthropologist Tone Bringa (2005) sets the record straight.
Building on her ﬁeldwork in central Bosnia (which I relate in more detail
below) for a total period of 6 years, from 1988 to 1993, Bringa notes in her
critique of Kaplan’s work that before the war in the ethnically mixed village
(Muslim Bosnians and Catholic Croats) where she carried out her ﬁeldwork,
adherents of the two separate religious communities helped each other build
the village church and the mosque, attended one another’s holy days, and
extended a hand to one another while building houses. These observations
on the ground refute Kaplan’s overgeneralized, impressionistic statements
about the violent nature of the region’s inhabitants. The ‘‘ancient hatreds’’
argument is further contradicted by the work of another anthropologist
Lockwood, who, as early as the 1970s, documented in his ethnography
The European Moslems (1975) how Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were
peacefully woven into the social fabric through the integrative mechanism of
the marketplace.
In a tone somewhat more sophisticated and ostensibly more scholarly
than that of Kaplan, Samuel Huntington sees the violence in Bosnia as an
instance of a clash of three civilizations, namely the Western, Islamic, and
Eastern Orthodox ones. This was a war occurring at what Huntington
(1993) named a civilizational faultline. His analysis was contradicted when
the Christian United States brokered the peace agreement – thus possibly
saving Bosnian Muslims from extinction on a much larger scale than had
happened thus far – and also accommodated hundreds of thousands of
Bosnian Muslims as refugees during and after the war.8 As noted by
anthropologist Brown (2005), Huntington’s theory that countries belonging
in the same ‘‘civilizational kin group’’ (a term invented by Huntington, who
is not a kinship theorist) was discredited by on-the-ground empirical reality.
Based on his ﬁeldwork in the region, Brown exposes how the kin links that
Huntington thought were so clearly identiﬁed were much more complex
given the institution of ﬁctive kinship in the Balkans whereby people became
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related to one another through kumtsvo (godfatherhood) ties, which
crosscut so-called civilizational attachments.
I suggested at the beginning of this paper that explanations of collective
violence based solely on the macro concepts of state, nation, religion, and
history tend to remain rather rigid. With reference to various treatments of
the Bosnian war, I emphasize that a view from below would either substantially complement such accounts (as in the case of Cigar’s macrophenomenal account of the causes of Serbian atrocities) or expose the irrelevance of
them to concrete situations experienced by real human beings in real locales
(as in the case of Kaplan’s and Huntington’s accounts of the factors behind
the escalation of collective violence). An anthropological approach seems
better suited to help understand otherwise unexpected cases of violence: How
did ethnonationalist exclusivist discourse get structurally simpliﬁed to the
village level, as a result of which neighbors, covillagers, perhaps old-time
friends and conﬁdantes turned against one another?9 The following section
seeks to describe instances of structural simpliﬁcation by relying on the
ethnographic work of anthropologist Tone Bringa in a central Bosnian
village. By structural simpliﬁcation, I mean that process in which a larger
opposition between two overarching identities gets parochialized through the
identiﬁcation of any such overarching identity with its local counterpart.
In this process, the differences invoked at the macrolevel (discursive, or
otherwise) between the larger forces of opposition are simpliﬁed and
selectively appropriated to forge new identities, ﬁlling in, or overriding, a
preexisting set of local relations with new and mutually oppositional content.
The following brief discussion seeks to demonstrate the dissolution and
parochialization of exclusivist nationalism in the context of the relations
between Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians. Although the foregoing
discussion has focused on the development and outcomes of Serbian
nationalist aggression, in this paper I am less concerned with the origins of
the ethnonationalist discourse than with the actual dynamics involved in the
process of structural simpliﬁcation.

33
35
37
39

STRUCTURAL SIMPLIFICATION OF
ETHNONATIONALIST EXCLUSIVISM: BRINGA’S
CASE OF DOLINA IN CENTRAL BOSNIA
The village where Bringa conducted her ﬁeldwork over a period of 6 years is
a mixed (Muslim–Croat) village located in central Bosnia, and a 2 h drive to
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the capital Sarajevo. Bringa refers to the village with the pseudonym Dolina.
A simpliﬁed, parochialized version of national superiority voiced at the
macrolevel by such ﬁgures as Serbian leader Milosevic (or, alternatively, in
the case of Croatian nationalism, by Croat President Tudjman) in the village
is seen in the remarks of the only Serbian inhabitant of Dolina vis-à-vis
his Muslim covillagers. Bringa notes that this man would say that his
fellow Muslim villagers had, in fact, Serbian blood in their veins (Bringa,
1996, p. 30), which seems to be a telling example of what may be termed
‘‘consanguinal expansionism.’’10 This demonstrates the structural simpliﬁcation of Serbian academic exclusivism (which considers Bosnian Muslims
nonentities except when they are considered Serbs) to the village context.
Another instance indicative of the simpliﬁcation of supralocal nationalist
rhetoric becomes manifest through villagers’ changing greeting practices.
While in the public space of communal interaction, village inhabitants
came to use ethnicity-or religion-neutral phrases of greeting when they
encountered one another during various times of the day and on different
occasions (on the road, while attending a feast, in neighborly visits, etc.),
and they reserved exclusive greetings for intraethnic encounters (Croat vs.
Croat, or Muslim vs. Muslim). Eventually, the escalating symbolicdiscursive and physical violence found a localized manifestation: once
Croat forces gained control of the municipality to which Dolina belonged,
Croat-speciﬁc greetings dominated the public realm (for example, the
dealings at administrative ofﬁces and in the marketplace), thus extending
macrolevel ethnic exclusivism (the idealized ‘‘Greater Croatia’’) to the
parochial level by exerting linguistic dominion over a particular portion of
everyday life through the imposition of a new greeting structure. As Bringa
notes: ‘‘Indeed, the Catholic Croats were redeﬁning the whole area (market
town and surrounding villages) as ‘‘theirs’’ and transforming the local
Muslims into outsiders, people who did not belong, [which] was one of the
many steps in a long series of more or less violent measures to squeeze the
Muslims out of their villages and the municipality’’ (1996, pp. 57–58).
Yet another example of the simpliﬁcation of high-level nationalist politics
whereby Bosnian Muslims were represented as remnants of Asiatic darkness
and backwardness, relates to Dolina’s Catholic (Croat) girls’ changing
perceptions of Muslim girls’ dressing patterns. One of Bringa’s Croat
informants in the village notes that whereas they have left the ways of their
parents’ choices in clothing behind (and have thus become less and less
separable from the modern urban woman), Muslim girls keep more and
more to their ways. The expression seems to be a subtle practice of
‘‘othering’’ whereby Muslim girls are pushed into the categories of rural and

64

1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15

FETHI KELES

traditional (Bringa, 1995, pp. 61–62). What is interesting, of course, is the
emergence of an otherwise nonexistent practice. Although each group of
girls’ parents did not conceptualize one another in terms of their differing
clothing practices, the nationalist rhetoric – disseminated through broadcast
media, enforced as law in the emerging, ethnically-drafted constitutions
(Hayden, 1996) – results in the creation of a simpliﬁed mirror image of
differentiation and othering in the village context via changing perceptions
regarding a group’s dress.
With reference to Bringa’s work, we have seen some examples of how
macrolevel nationalist discourse manifests itself in a village in the context of
consanguinal perceptions, expressions of greeting, and dressing patterns.11
What follows is review of some key observations made by a number of
political anthropologists regarding localized manifestations of macrolevel
discourses which may result in changed perceptions of old friends and
existing relations.
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ETHNIFICATION, FOCALIZATION, AND
TRANSVALUATION: RELEVANCE OF POLITICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY TO ANALYSES OF THE
WAR IN BOSNIA
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The structural simpliﬁcation process as a result of which old-time fellows,
covillagers, and neighbors begin to subtly perceive one another through a
reconﬁgured framework of relations – that is, perceive one another as
belonging to different natures, historical roots, and linguistic groups – can
be referred to as a case of ‘‘ethniﬁcation.’’ Although anthropologist
Friedman (1998) uses the term ethniﬁcation as part of his Marxist approach
with which he seeks to explain expressions of declining hegemony, the term
has descriptive utility in the context of the war in Bosnia. In particular,
Friedman suggests that ethniﬁcation, the turn toward an understanding of
the nation-state ‘‘yin which the nation is dominant, where the nation-state
is converted from a contractual to a familistic-ascriptive model’’ (1998,
p. 288) is an expression of the decline of a civilizational perspective based
on commercial capitalism. Thus, from the Titoist social contract in which
Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Slovenes, and Montenegrins were ‘‘Yugoslav’’
emerged exclusivist, ethniﬁed understandings of separate families of nations
(for instance, the Serb nation idealized in the Memorandum as the
‘‘Greater Serbia’’) which admitted of no aliens: hence, Balkanization ensues
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(1995, p. 291). In other words, regional disorder was followed by huge
migratory ﬂows and demographic exchanges in the Balkans, speciﬁcally
in Bosnia, as the result of a war guided by a macropolitical ethniﬁed
perception of state which dictated intrastate homogeneity (that is, Serbia for
Serbs, Croatia for Croats). The term can have both macrolevel and
microlevel application. The Serbian villager’s remark that the others too are
of Serbian blood may be considered an expression of homogenizing
ethniﬁcation by which the ‘‘others’’ are precluded from having the right to
their own identity. Furthermore, the increasing visibility of Croat-speciﬁc
greetings in the public space could be seen as another expression of
homogenizing ethniﬁcation by which the ‘‘others’’ are precluded from the
reconstructed public space should they decline to conform to the new
linguistic habits.
Two other concepts by another anthropologist Stanley Tambiah (1996)
may serve as useful heuristic devices in the context of the analysis of the
war in Bosnia: focalization and transvaluation. ‘‘By focalization [Tambiah
means], the process of progressive denudation of local incidents and
disputes of their particulars of context and their aggregation. Transvaluation
refers to the parallel process of assimilating particulars to a larger, collective,
more enduring, and therefore less context-bound, cause or interest’’
(Tambiah, 1996, p. 192). I introduce these terms not because they are
used in Tambiah’s (1996) work to describe processes similar to those I have
called instances of structural simpliﬁcation, but because they illustrate
the reverse trends (in other words, they capture what Sahlins would call
structural ampliﬁcation). For example, Tambiah employs these two terms
while describing ‘‘how the original issue of the death of a schoolgirl
ballooned into a more general protest against the inequities of the public
transport system, and that, again, into an anti-Pathan backlash’’ (1996,
p. 191). As I noted in the beginning, I am interested in the reverse process
by which general, macrolevel conﬂicts and exclusivist discourses are
parochialized by the receivers of such discourses. Tambiah’s terms may
help describe the process whereby, for example, Serbian historiography
strips the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 (where Serbs were defeated by the
invading Ottomans) out of its context, and instrumentalizes that event by
trying to assimilate the memory of it into the larger Serbian macropolitical
objective vilifying the Muslims of Bosnia (who converted to Islam following
the Ottoman conquest, and therefore, assumed the identity of the invader,
as claimed by Serbian historiography). Thus, by placing these two terms
against structural simpliﬁcation, I hope to have made my terminological
suggestion clearer.
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1

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

3

In this chapter, I ﬁrst raised the idea that blaming collective political
violence on differences in civilization, competitive ideas of statehood, and
normative constructions of ethnonational group identity reveals very little,
if at all, about how these differences, competitions, and vying constructions
manifest themselves in the everyday practices of victims as well as
perpetrators of destructive political conduct. In fact, interpreting collective
violence as mere consequences of top–down orchestrations is limiting
the political to the realm of governments, political parties, nationalist
leaders, etc. Without looking at how the political is embedded in everyday
practices, how it manifests itself through real human beings’ dealings in such
real locales as the village, the street, and the marketplace, one is unable to
understand in their multifaceted dimensions the complex processes as well as
instruments in and through which objectives declared, legitimized, or forced
by the governmental or ruling elite get accepted and/or rejected by their
addressees. Thus, when critiquing political scientist David Easton’s view
that there existed no such thing as political anthropology because
‘‘practitioners of this nondiscipline had utterly failed to mark off the
political system from other systems of society’’ (Lewellen, 2003, pp. x–xi),
Lewellen notes that the attempt to locate politics in everyday routines is in
fact political anthropology’s greatest virtue. The discussion in this paper
of some instances of structural simpliﬁcation would show to some extent
that events in former Yugoslavia at the level of what Easton would call the
‘‘clearly marked off political system’’ need to be complemented and/or
corrected with an eye on micropolitics. Unless we conceptualize the
increased use of Croat greetings in public spaces, the commentary on
Muslim girls’ (‘‘backward, rural’’) dressing patterns, the attempt by the
Serbian villager at enhancing the scope of consanguines as truly political
phenomena in view of the then-reigning nationalist rhetoric, we are bound
to fall short of understanding the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia in its complexity.
The heuristic devices of structural ampliﬁcation, focalization and transvaluation, are useful in conceiving of the aspect pertaining to how historically
speciﬁc, localized cases are ballooned or inﬂated for utilization as part of
larger nationalistic discourses. With the idea of structural simpliﬁcation,
however, we can conceptualize how broader macrophenomenal realities are
locally parochialized and manifested in everyday practices. My hope is that
structural simpliﬁcation will yield greater understanding of what happened
in Bosnia as well as serve as a useful conceptual tool in future research on
political conﬂict.
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NOTES
1. Including, but not limited to, so-called ancient ethnonational hatreds, religious
radicalism, and historically motivated territorial irredentism. In general, the
adjectives macropolitical, macrostructural, and macrophenomenal are used in this
paper to refer to those supraindividual groups, entities, or factors (‘‘the nation,’’
‘‘the state,’’ ‘‘history,’’ ‘‘religion,’’ etc.) otherwise claimed to have an exclusive
causative impact on the emergence and sustenance of political conﬂict.
2. By which Sahlins (2005) means a group of Cubans escaping Castro, traveling in
a boat (or some other craft), ﬁghting sharks across the straits of Florida as well as the
US Coast Guard, and, if successful, landing in Miami.
3. I recognize that the history of the 1991–1995 Balkan conﬂict, which resulted
in the collapse of former Yugoslavia, is a contested one. But this paper should
essentially be construed as a theoretical exercise, rather than as an attempt to explain
why one set of contested explanations is preferable over another. My broader aim is
to apply an inversion of anthropologist Marshall Sahlins’ theoretical constructs with
a view to developing a heuristic device to link macrolevel factors to microlevel
practices. Given the limits of this paper, I cannot do justice to all accounts of the
conﬂict that seek to explain it from various angles. Readers interested in getting a
much fuller discussion of the contested accounts may consult Ramet (2005).
4. Kosovo was an autonomous region under the Serbian republic in the former
federal Yugoslav state.
5. In particular, Croatia, Bosnia, and Slovenia.
6. Including Bosnians of different ethnic backgrounds, that is, Bosnian Muslims
(major victims), Bosnian Croats, and even Bosnian Serbs who refused to acquiesce to
the cleansing project.
7. For more detailed accounts of the war, see Cushman and Mestrovic (1996),
Mestrovic (1997), Cohen (1997), and Burg and Shoup (2000).
8. I do not have the space here to extend this critique of Huntington’s work.
I offer a longer discussion in Keles (2007).
9. One reviewer who commented on this article suggested that ‘‘it seems to be the
macro-level politics and rhetoric (the ethno-nationalist ideal of ethnically pure
interaction) that is a simpliﬁcation of the complex pattern of interaction on the local
level,’’ rather than local level interactions being simpliﬁed, less complex versions of
macrolevel discursive battles. Ultimately, this boils down to the question of whether
macrolevel factors (for instance, nationalist, political leadership) met the public
already raising exclusivist sentiments, or whether the public (otherwise relatively
peacefully interwoven through the marketplace, intermarriage, and educational
institutions) subsequently grew suspicious of one another’s neighbors, coworkers,
etc. Following the ﬁrst track runs the risk of feeding fodder to the uncritical thesis
that imagines the Balkans as a land of perpetual violence, where past grievances are
never settled and latent hate is the order of the day. I am more inclined to the latter
track, in view of the former U.S. President Clinton’s foreword to the volume by
Swanee Hunt (2004), former U.S. Ambassador to Austria, where Clinton noted:
‘‘As the war raged in Bosnia, Hunty brought to my attention news not making
headlines: that the women of Bosnia had been organizing to try to prevent the war,
and they were still doing what they couldy to hold together their culturally diverse
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communities.’’ Consider also what one Bosnian woman, Nurdzihana, said after the
war: ‘‘I’ve never accepted ethnic divisions. The way I was raised, we didn’t say
someone belongs to this or that ethnic group. The atrocities I witnessed had no
ethnicity, no religion. We lived together until the day before’’ (Hunt, 2004, p. 95).
10. By which term I want to refer to that effort to expand one’s range of blood
relatives, hence including them into an imaginary ‘‘one of us’’ category.
11. I acknowledge that the illustrations excerpted from Bringa’s work tell only
part of the story in the run-up to the war. For more detailed examples of pre-war
(that is, pre-1990) happenings, one can peruse Bringa’s ICTY testimony available at
http://www.un.org/icty/transe16/990712it.htm (I thank an anonymous reviewer for
bringing the testimony to my attention). There, Bringa discusses at some length how
the increasing Croat military presence in the region and the repeated, Croatcontrolled media broadcasts instilled a sense of fear which reconﬁgured the way in
which Croat inhabitants came to see their long-time covillagers as ethnic others.
What seems to have emerged from complex military objectives and carefully planned
broadcasts is a divisive process that produced simple, previously nonexistent, and
ethnically deﬁned ‘‘us versus them’’ perceptions of a hostile nature.
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